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I.  Introduction 
Among government officials, policy makers, and key market observers, calls to restore confidence in 
the global financial system have become international mantra. In a March 2009 interview, for example, 
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke stated, “[C]onfidence is key. People don’t know what’s 
happening. And they’re afraid. And they’re not sure . . . .  and I think the way to get confidence is to show 
progress.” Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, indicated the danger of not repairing 
confidence in a press briefing the same month, declaring, “If we act slowly and less decisively, we’re 
likely to see what happened in other countries: a slide in confidence.” U.K. Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, meanwhile, asserted in a joint statement that world 
leaders must “take whatever action is necessary to restore confidence, stabilize financial markets, and 
enable families and companies to get through the global recession.” Similar sentiment was expressed in 
the G-20 Leaders’ Statement issued in conjunction with the group’s London meetings in early April.  
Restoring confidence is a crucial step in repairing financial markets and lifting the global economy 
out of recession. How to measure confidence, however, and in a larger sense how to go about restoring it, 
are more complex. In the former regard, there exists a variety of market and survey based indicators of 
consumer confidence, investment sentiment, and business confidence used to express the views and 
outlook of the investor, household or business community on the future course of markets or the economy 
at large. In the latter regard, much hope is being pinned on the ability of countries to undertake 
coordinated stimulus efforts. Initial policy responses by central banks addressed the lack of liquidity in 
financial markets, but were unable to stem the loss of confidence. Thus, broader measures were put in 
place to recapitalize banks, provide fiscal stimulus, and reform financial regulation. The G-20 meetings, 
in particular, were viewed as a chief forum for negotiating and planning the way forward. While the 
meetings begat promises for actions intended to improve confidence in both developed and developing 
countries, details of policy intentions and evidence of implementation remain to be seen. 
This paper develops a framework for gauging changes in investor confidence that have potentially 
important  financial and economic consequences.  We start with the view that investors’ beliefs are 
embodied in market prices, and reflect expectations of economic fundamentals (including the paths of 
employment, trade, housing prices, and industrial production). Those expectations, in turn, are affected by 
recent investment performance and by government policy measures. Furthermore, investor confidence is 
likely to be linked to consumer confidence. Using this framework, we provide a gauge of the extent to 
which  various measures of confidence deteriorated since the start of the crisis  and link changes in 
confidence to various economic variables and events.  We report on individual indicators as well as 
calculating common factors that express the extent of co-movement of different indicators. These 
indicators show the dramatic deterioration of confidence that occurred as the crisis unfolded, and the 




II.  Motivation 
Probably the most dramatic aspect of the crisis has been the degree to which the public at large has 
lost confidence in the stability of financial system and in future economic security. Drawing on major 
press coverage of the financial crisis, we can assess the degree to which the sentiment of the public at 
large has been affected. The rationale here is that the media help shape the views of their readers, while at 
the same time reflecting the overall climate of confidence or insecurity. We conducted a Web search of 
media references to the crisis, capturing the number of times that terms such as “financial crisis,” 
“financial meltdown,” “financial turbulence,” “financial turmoil” appeared in major financial media: 
Bloomberg (headlines from terminal), Financial Express (India), Financial Times, New York Times, The 
Economic Times (India), The Economist, The Guardian, and the Wall Street Journal. Interestingly, this 
indicator does not show a dramatic deterioration until October 2008, that is, until shortly after the Lehman 
failure, when the stock market and other prices plummeted. Its movements suggest that the financial crisis 
moved to a new phase at that time, becoming much more widespread and generalized (see Figure 1). 
Confidence has been shaken by the severity of the crisis and by its unique features—including 
heightened volatility in all financial markets; plunging equity prices that have erased trillions of dollars of 
households’ wealth; and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions that have led to successive 
announcements of bleaker forecasts and desperate policy measures. These and other factors have inflated 
the public’s foreboding about the economic future, a feeling reinforced by major securities scandals and 
the failure of prestigious global financial firms. Drawing parallels with the Great Depression, reputable 
commentators have sharpened the public’s consciousness of the severity of the crisis, as memories of that 
era conjure up images of severe economic hardship, political instability, and self-defeating protectionism. 
Confidence has been especially shaken by the fact that the crisis originated in the United States, the heart 
of the global financial system, the country reputed to have the most advanced financial system and 
effective financial regulation and supervision. 4 
 




The high correlations of coverage across major media outlets, as reported in the table below, are an 
indication of the global nature of the crisis. 
Table 1. Correlation matrix for all searches 














Bloomberg Headlines  1.00  0.66  0.96  0.97  0.99  0.94  0.96  0.97 
Financial Express (India)     1.00  0.65  0.78  0.70  0.74  0.76  0.70 
FT        1.00  0.95  0.97  0.94  0.98  0.98 
NYT           1.00  0.98  0.95  0.98  0.98 
The Economic Times (India)              1.00  0.94  0.97  0.97 
The Economist                 1.00  0.97  0.95 
The Guardian                    1.00  0.99 
WSJ                        1.00 
Source: World Bank staff 
estimates                         
 
III.   A Framework for Measuring Investor Confidence  
Measuring changes in investor confidence is not an easy task, since it must be grounded in the 
psychology of investor behavior and attitudes. There are two main approaches: using surveys of investors 
or constructing indices based on market information. The first approach uses surveys of investors’ 
opinions on particular issues at particular times and often focuses on a specific segment of the investor 
community–for example institutional investors in the United States (Shiller,  2000) or private equity 
investors in the United Kingdom (Deloitte, 2009).  















































































































































































The other approach uses market information. An example is the index of investor confidence 
provided by State Street Global Markets, which is based on institutional investors’ holdings of risky 
assets, particularly equities (Ken Froot, www.statestreet.com/investmentconfidenceindex). The more 
investors are willing to allocate assets to equities, the theory goes, the greater their risk appetite and 
confidence.  
What, exactly, needs to be measured? Drawing on insights from three strands of finance literature—
behavioral finance (Thaler, 1985, 1987; Loewenstein and Elster, 1992; Nisbett and Ross, 1980), investor 
sentiment (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Froot, O'Connell, and Seasholes, 2001; Froot and 
Ramadorai, 2008), and market reaction to macroeconomic news (Balduzzi, 2001; Brandt and Kavajecz, 
2004; Goldberg and Leonard 2003)—we postulate four dimensions of investor confidence: market 
volatility, market performance, macroeconomic news, and government responses (see Diagram 1). 
Diagram 1. Four dimensions of investor confidence 














•  First, investor psychology is strongly influenced by the scale of abnormal volatility  in the 
marketplace, particularly when that volatility spans several asset classes, signaling an overall climate 
of uncertainty and risk aversion. In recent months, global  equity markets have shown record 
volatility.  
•  Second, investor confidence is related to the performance of their investments, as measured by wealth 
creation or destruction. The scale of the contraction in financial wealth that has occurred during the 
current crisis has been unprecedented since the Great Depression.  
•  Third, investors and traders typically look at a broad array of macroeconomic data releases that 
provide insights into economic fundamentals and shape perceptions of the future state of the 
economy. Relevant series include monthly payrolls, industrial production, sales and trade data, 
personal income, and housing starts. These data typically lag behind the financial data, but during the 
course of 2008 and into 2009 the one-sided stream of negative economic news has had a dramatic 
impact on confidence.  
•  Fourth, market participants and traders pay close attention to the stance of government policy makers 
and continually assess the credibility of their responses. Governments can influence investors’ 
confidence in many ways: through macroeconomic policy (for example, by easing monetary policy or 
providing fiscal stimulus), through regulatory policy, and through other legislative actions that can 
strengthen transparency and enhance corporate financial disclosure and integrity (for example, actions 
taken by the U.S. government in the aftermath of the Enron scandal). While the measures announced 
or taken to date have no doubt helped somewhat to stem the deterioration in confidence, they have not 
been able to offset the negative effects of grim financial and macroeconomic developments.  
We use publicly available data to proxy the first three dimensions of investor confidence, while 
providing a more selective discussion of the various policy responses, in particular the expansion of 
central bank liquidity, before turning to what remains to be done. The above framework for measuring 
investor confidence enables us to gauge the extent to which confidence has deteriorated and to link 
changes in confidence to various economic events. What is striking is the extent to which the various 
indicators move together, though each has a somewhat different story to tell and provides different 
insights. We report on individual indicators as well as calculating common factors that express the extent 
of co-movement of different indicators.  
 7 
 
IV. Interpretation  
Turning first to the measures of market volatility and investor anxiety, they show a sharp 
deterioration in credit markets in August/September 2007 (as measured by the TED spread, the spread 
between interest rates paid by the US Treasury and those prevailing in the interbank market) followed by 
movements in a fairly narrow range until September/October 2008, when confidence suffered a massive 
deterioration following the failure of Lehman Brothers (Figure 2). Since that time, there has been a 
substantial narrowing of the TED spread, as liquidity in credit markets has improved. Other indicators of 
market volatility (the VIX and measured volatility in commodity and foreign exchange markets) were 
slower to increase but have since risen to high levels and have not seen much improvement as the crisis 
has spread and become more severe. The measure of overall market volatility thus has remained at a very 
high level, though somewhat below its peak in October 2008. 
A second influence on investor psychology is the market performance of investments. Dramatic 
declines in wealth have occurred in all of the world’s equity markets—in the United States, other 
industrial countries, and emerging markets (Figure 3). In February 2009, equity markets stood at their 
lowest point in more than a decade, a fact that has exerted a continuing depressive effect on consumer 
confidence, though a sharp rebound in stock markets beginning in March suggests that a durable 
improvement may be underway.  
The overall performance of the economy is an important factor in investor confidence because it 
affects prospects for employment income as well as the values of nonfinancial and financial assets. Until 
the end of 2007, macroeconomic indicators in major industrial countries had not shown much 
deterioration (Figure 4). By the end of 2008, however, these series had declined to levels that signaled 
that the current global recession was the most severe in the postwar period. 
A fourth important factor influencing investor confidence is the stance of government policy. Rather 
than attempting to construct a composite indicator that reflects the many facets of government actions in 
the economy, we describe the initial policy responses to the crisis in the next section and consider what 
remains to be done. So far, policy measures have not re-established confidence, and so more decisive 
measures, including regulatory reform, are necessary. 8 
 
Figure 2. Indicators of market volatility and anxiety 
   
Source: Bloomberg
Note: 1/ Exchange rate common factor from a factor analysis of the annualized coefficient of variation of daily exchange rates (EUR, 
JPY and GBP); for commodity prices a factor analysis of the annualized coefficient of variation of daily prices (agriculture, energy 
and metals)
2/ Overall market volatility common factor from a factor analysis of VIX, daily exchange rates (EUR, JPY and GBP), commodity 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of volatility indicators 
  Equity  Credit  Currency  Commodities 
Equity  1       
Credit  0.74  1     
Currency  0.80  0.60  1   
Commodities  0.77  0.65  0.76  1 
Source: Bloomberg       
 
The overall market volatility index is derived as the common factor in a factor analysis of eight variables 
spanning equity (VIX); currency (rolling standard deviations of daily changes in USD/Euro, USD/Yen, 
USD/Sterling; commodities (rolling standard deviations of three broad sets of commodity prices: 
agriculture, energy, and industrial metals prices); and credit (TED). 
Figure 3. Indicators of wealth decline 
 
Source: Bloomberg
Note: The MSCI EM index includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Turkey.
The MSCI WORLD index includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, HK, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
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Figure 4. Macroeconomic indicators 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix of macroeconomic indicators 
  Employment Growth  Industrial Growth  Export Growth 
Employment Growth  1     
Industrial Growth  0.91  1   
Export Growth  0.86  0.92  1 
Source: Bloomberg, Datastream, ILO, UK Statistical Office   
 
The overall macroeconomic index is derived as the predicted common factor in a factor analysis of 12 
variables (transformed into year-on-year growth in all cases): the U.S. index of industrial production, the 
German index of industrial production (including construction), the U.K. index of production (all 
industries), the Japanese index of production (all industries), U.S. total exports, German exports f.o.b., 
U.K. exports, Japanese exports, U.S. nonfarm employment, Germans engaged in economic activity, U.K. 
employment, and Japanese employment. One factor explains 64 percent of the common variance. 
 
        
(in percent)
Source: Bloomberg, Datastream, ILO, UK Statistical Office
Note: The overall macroeconomic index is derived as the predicted common factor in a factor analysis of twelve variables 
(transformed into Y-o-Y growth in all cases): US index of industrial production, Germany index of industrial production (incl. 
construction), UK index of production (all industries), Japan index of production (all industries), US total exports, Germany exports 
f.o.b., UK exports, Japan exports, US nonfarm total employed, Germany persons engaged in economic activity, UK all persons in 
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V.  Using the State Street Measure of Investor Confidence 
As a check to see whether our indicators capture investor sentiment, it is useful to try to relate them to 
a variable that purports to capture institutional investors’ risk appetite. In particular, we regress the State 
Street Advisors measure of their holdings of risky versus other assets—on  the various confidence 
measures we have just described, namely market volatility, industrial production, and stock market 
performance. As shown in the table below, regressions show a consistently significant and negative effect 
of market volatility on the State Street Measure of Investor Confidence. The same is true (with a positive 
sign) of industrial production, and stock market performance. 
Table 4. Risk appetite and selected indicators of confidence 
Dependent variable: Risk Appetite 
  (Model 1)  (Model 2) 
Volatility Factor 
-2.003  -2.156** 
 
(1.245)  (0.968) 
Industrial Growth Factor 
0.545   
 
(2.341)   
MSCI Developed World 
0.325***  0.339*** 
 
(0.077)  (0.077) 
Constant 
85.332***  85.339*** 
 
(1.292)  (1.276) 
Observations  60  60 
R-squared 
0.620  0.626 
 
Equities Macro Volatility R × + × + × + = 3 2 1 β β β α  
 
 In this regression, the dependent variable is represented by ‘Risk Appetite’ (proxied by the State 
Street Investor Confidence Index).Volatility is the monthly average of the predicted daily common factor 
across eight variables: VIX, usd/euro volatility, usd/yen volatility, usd/sterling volatility, agriculture 
commodities price index volatility, energy price index volatility, industrial metals price index volatility, 
and the TED spread. Industrial growth is the predicted common factor across industrial production growth 
rates(y-o-y) in the USA, UK, Germany and Japan. Equity market growth is represented by the change (y-
o-y) in the MSCI for developed economies. Table 4 shows that risk appetite seems to be most closely 
related to developed world market performance and to market volatility, while industrial growth is 
positive, but not significant.  Figure 5 shows that the regression captures a substantial part of the variation 
of risk appetite, including the large full during the crisis. 12 
 
Figure 5. Risk Appetite 
The estimation sample covers January 2004 - December 2008. 
 
 
This measure of investor confidence appears to have some predictive power in explaining the behavior of  
stock markets, in both developed and developing countries.   
In order to gauge the relationship between investor confidence and local capital markets, we 
calculated simple correlations between the confidence variable (the State Street Investor Confidence 
Index) and the country level US$ MSCI across a sample of countries with available data. An interesting 
result is that during the downturn period from June 2007 to March 2009, the proportion of countries 
whose capital markets are positively and highly correlated with the confidence indicator is much higher 
than in the boom period from Jan 2004 to May 2007 (Figure 6). In particular, less than 5 % of the 77 
countries with available data have a positive correlation with the confidence index greater than 0.5 during 
the boom period versus 65% during the bust (or 40% if calculations are performed on annual growth rates 
which posit a relationship between changes in investor confidence and the market rate of return).   
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Figure 6. Investor confidence and local capital market valuation 1/ 
 
VI.  The Relationship between Investor and Consumer Confidence 
Our indicators of market volatility, macro environment  and equity market performance are  also 
significantly related to an indicator of consumer confidence—  the common factor across consumer 
confidence indices in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and Japan (Table 5). An 
alternate indicator measuring investor risk appetite, namely the State Street Advisors’ measure of 
institutional investor holdings of risky versus other assets, is also correlated with the consumer confidence 
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markedly  late in 2008, but has not shown the continued decline in 2009 exhibited by consumer 
confidence. 
Table 5. Regression of consumer confidence on investor confidence components 
Dependent variable: Consumer Confidence Factor 
  (Model 1)  (Model 2) 
Volatility factor  -0.273***  -0.301*** 
  (0.056)  (0.059) 
Macro environment factor  0.233***   
  (0.056)   
Macro environment factor (t-1)    0.237*** 
    (0.051) 
MSCI Developed World  0.012***  0.013*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Constant  -0.050  -0.069* 
  (0.042)  (0.040) 
Observations  97  97 
R-squared  0.72  0.75 
Equities Macro Volatility CC × + × + × + = 3 2 1 β β β α  
The dependent variable is the common factor of consumer confidence indices from United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Germany and Japan. Volatility is the monthly average of the predicted daily common factor across eight 
variables: VIX, US$/euro volatility, US$/yen volatility, US$/sterling volatility, agriculture commodities price index 
volatility, energy price index volatility, industrial metals price index volatility, and the TED spread. The macro 
environment factor is the predicted common factor across industrial production, employment and export growth 
rates (year-on-year) in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. Equity market growth is 
represented by the change (year-on-year) in the MSCI for developed economies. The estimation sample covers the 
period from January 2001 to Jan 2009. 15 
 
VII.  What Can Policy Do to Improve Confidence?   
Liquidity expansion and easing interest rates 
Initial policy responses to the unfolding crisis centered on the provision of liquidity, since the initial 
symptoms involved the effective shutdown of interbank markets and markets for securitizations. In 
August 2007, central banks in the industrialized countries began to provide unprecedented amounts of 
funding to their banking systems, creating new facilities that extended the range of securities they would 
accept, the institutions to which they would lend, and the terms of their lending.  
In January 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that it would make dollars available to the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank so that they could on-lend funds to their 
banks with international operations. The Fed also introduced at that time three new facilities. The term 
auction facility grants liquidity for up to 84 days. The primary dealer credit facility extended the right to 
access Fed credit beyond the commercial banks to investment banks—in fact, to all primary dealers with 
which the Fed performs open-market operations. The term securities lending facility allows investment 
banks to borrow Treasury securities using mortgage-backed securities as collateral. In addition, the Fed 
extended the term of its existing facilities, granting discount-window lending to banks for terms up to 90 
days, allowing repurchase agreements extending over 28 days, and accepting mortgage-backed securities 
rather than the usual Treasury securities. Other central banks also expanded their liquidity provisions and 
coordinated their announcements of the extended facilities. Starting in January 2008, the U.S. Federal 
Reserve created swap facilities for other central banks whose commercial banks needed access to dollar 
liquidity.  
In this section we attempt to quantify the provision of liquidity by the major central banks, and gauge 
its effect on confidence. Our measure of global liquidity is the monetary base of the four component 
currencies of the SDR, namely the US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, and pound sterling, plus the holdings of 
foreign exchange reserves in these currencies by the world’s central banks. In the period leading up to the 
crisis, to a large extent foreign exchange reserve accumulation by other central banks was the main engine 
of global liquidity. With the onset of the crisis, the engine for liquidity expansion became the rapid 
growth of base money in the United States, the euro area, Japan and the United Kingdom. While some 
reserve accumulation continued, it slowed as a result of the decline of commodity prices and the 
dampening of global activity and exports (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Growth of Global Liquidity 
.  
 
Two phases need to be distinguished. In the period from 2002 to mid-2007, major central banks 
followed monetary policies that were initially expansionary but gradually tightened, while other central 
banks, especially in Asia and in the oil exporting countries, accumulated large quantities of reserves as a 
result of substantial balance of payments surpluses. During this period, China’s central bank, for instance, 
increased its foreign exchange reserves from $200 billion to $1.5 trillion. These reserves were mainly 
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base money in the United States, the euro area, Japan and the United Kingdom. While some reserve 
accumulation continued, it slowed as a result of the decline of commodity prices and the dampening of 
global activity and exports. During the first phase, strong growth in liquidity helped to keep interest rates 
low and inflate the prices of a wide range of financial assets. The bursting of the housing bubble and 
resulting crisis of confidence in assets backed by sub-prime mortgages brought an end to this phase. In the 
second phase, monetary authorities reacted to the problems in interbank and credit markets by expanding 
their balance sheets to an unprecedented extent in an effort to revive them. 
As the crisis threatened to spread to the real economy, central banks and treasuries adopted additional 
measures. They eased monetary policy, eventually lowering their target rates to historically low levels. By 
April 2009 the Federal Reserve’s interest rate target had been lowered to a range of 0–0.25 percent, the 
Bank of Canada’s and the Bank of England’s to 0.5 percent, and the ECB’s to 1.25 percent. Because the 
zero bound on interest rates would soon limit further use of that instrument, central banks turned to 
“quantitative easing,” that is, expanding the money supply directly through purchases of various 
securities, in order to provide further monetary stimulus. 
The term liquidity, however, has two principal meanings, and the global liquidity measure captures 
just one of them, namely the volume of funds available for investment.  Another meaning is the ease and 
quickness with which assets  can be converted to cash, and this depends in turn on the volume of 
transactions for that particular asset and the spreads over comparable assets. A striking feature of the 
crisis is the extent to which the quantity of official liquidity available has become disconnected from the 
ease of realizing assets issued by banks or backed by private securities. In contrast to the above measure, 
liquidity in this second sense has decreased dramatically for all except government securities. A proxy for 
the deterioration of the liquidity in markets for claims on banks and for other non-government securities is 
the TED spread, which widened dramatically in September, 2008, and has not yet narrowed back to pre-
crisis levels. Monetary authorities banked on their ability to resolve the problems in private credit markets 
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Figure 8. TED spread, liquidity, the Fed’s target rate, and risk appetite 
 monthly, pre- and post-crisis 
 
Figure 8 plots the measure of global liquidity, the TED spread, and the State Street Advisors’ measure 
of risk appetite (or investor confidence), as well as the Federal Reserve’ target for the fed funds rate. The 
period from January 2000 until August 2007 saw a steady rise in liquidity as well as a decline in spreads, 
with little relationship with movements in risk appetite. Broad movements in the TED spread seem to 
mimic movements in the stance of monetary policy, as captured by the Fed’s operating target. As interest 
rates rise, so does the spread between commercial bank’s borrowing costs and the rate paid by the US 
treasury on its borrowing. The shaded crisis period however shows quite different behavior: a dramatic 
increase in spreads and a large decline in risk appetite, despite a further rise in global liquidity and a large 
fall in the Fed’s interest rate target. It is true that since October 2008 the rise in liquidity and easing of US 
monetary policy has been accompanied by a large fall in spreads, but spreads are still nowhere near their 
level in the 2003-04 period, when interest rates were also very low.  
Table 6 confirms these impressions. A regression run for the period before the crisis indicates a 
negative effect of liquidity on spreads, albeit an insignificant one, and a large and significant effect of the 
Fed’s monetary policy target. In the crisis period, the State Street risk appetite measure has a significant 
negative effect on spreads, while global liquidity again has an insignificant effect (though with the right 
sign, and larger in magnitude). The number of crisis observations is small, making it difficult to identify 
the determinants of the TED spread; only the risk appetite variable seems to have a significant influence 
on the spread. The crisis period illustrates the relative ineffectiveness of monetary policy alone to 
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Table 6. TED spread, risk appetite, and global liquidity  
 
  Pre-Crisis  Crisis 
  TED spread  TED spread 
State Street risk appetite  0.167  -4.141 
  (0.96)  (2.29)* 
World Liquidity / World GDP  0.429  -62.33 
  (0.41)  (0.88) 
Fed Funds Target  6.045  7.042 
  (10.56)**  (0.56) 
Constant  -8.446  1,281.496 
  (0.33)  (1.24) 
Observations  91  17 
R-squared  0.56  0.35 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
•  significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
Policy measures in many advanced countries have also  included substantial state intervention in 
virtually all aspects of the banking industry, including funding, loan portfolio, compensation, and 
dividend policy. Governments have moved beyond their traditional role of lender of last resort to a new 
status as “guardian of last resort “ in extending sovereign guarantees  to banks’ new  debt issuance  and  
risky assets,  as well as investing directly in  banks’ debt and equity instruments.  As of early March 2009, 
the total amount of cash invested in the banking industry by governments in the US and Europe had 
reached $538.6 billion, with the US spending $250 billion under the TARP’s Capital Purchase Program, 
and the UK spending $172.5 billion. Capital infusions had already led governments to acquire large 
stakes in banks in the United States, Britain, and continental Europe, but even more government financing 
seemed likely. 
Other policy measures 
In the last quarter of 2008, attention turned to broader policy measures to provide stimulus to the 
economy, in particular the use of fiscal policy.
2
                                                       
2 The US administration had already implemented fiscal stimulus in the second quarter, 2008, through tax rebates. 
While they temporarily boosted economic activity, they did not lead to a revival of confidence and the US 
experienced a sharp fall in GDP in the second half of the year.  
 Around the world, countries announced their plans. China 
unveiled a package of new and existing measures totaling some $600 billion, while the U.S. Congress 
approved, in February 2009, a fiscal stimulus program amounting to $787 billion and involving both tax 
cuts and increased spending on infrastructure and education, among other items. The fiscal stimulus 
measures will take time to take effect, especially infrastructure spending, which typically involves long 
lead times. It is too early to tell whether these measures will have a significant impact on confidence. It is 20 
 
also too early to predict whether they may have significant costs, both to the taxpayer and to private 
borrowers, if government borrowing crowds out other borrowers’ access to capital markets.  
At the global level, a two-pronged approach involving greater pooling of resources and addressing 
stronger cooperation across countries merits attention.  
Pooling of resources is important to resist a downward spiral in economic activity and in preventing 
the world recession from having a catastrophic impact on developing countries, in particular. Experience 
from the Latin American and Asian crises of the 1990s showed that to be effective, official financing 
must be substantial.  
Governments’ willingness to coordinate their policies can help reestablish confidence by ruling out 
beggar-thy-neighbor responses to the crisis. The danger of special interests using trade policy to protect 
particular industries is especially severe in a downturn. A joint international commitment to maintaining 
open markets for goods and services must be a central feature of governments’ policy responses. As for 
financial policies, there have been clear instances in which the absence of coordination has led to 
problems, as when Ireland initially guaranteed the deposits of domestic banks only, leading to runs on 
branches of foreign banks operating in the country. Ireland later extended the guarantee to all banks 
operating in Ireland, and other European countries also widened the scope of their deposit insurance.  
While the case for fiscal policy coordination is weak in normal times—because countries normally 
face very different challenges and priorities—it is called for today, as all countries are facing the same 
prospect of inadequate global demand. Stimulating aggregate demand through fiscal expansion is in 
everyone’s interest at the moment, but each country will be reluctant to undertake it on the necessary 
scale because some of the expansionary effects will spill over to other countries, and because a country 
acting alone—even the United States—may reasonably fear that increases in government debt will cause 
investors to lose confidence in its fiscal sustainability and so withdraw financing. Both of these 
constraints will be lessened by a commitment to coordinate a fiscal expansion globally.  
VIII.  How Could Regulatory Reform Help Restore Confidence?  
The financial crisis has increased the prominence of central banks in regulation and supervision, as 
increases in the scope of their liquidity provision has generated proposals to extend central bank 
supervision to all institutions that benefit from the central bank’s liquidity facilities. Moreover, regulation 
has significant cross-country aspects, since banking is increasingly global and is dominated by several 
multinational institutions. At present, inadequate regulation in one country can have major repercussions 
in others. The willingness to harmonize regulatory reform is likely to be influenced by the stage of the 
financial crisis. While the international spillover effects in the financial arena provide a continuing 
incentive for harmonization, regulatory cooperation has been resisted in normal times because of concern 
to maintain or further competitive advantage for each country’s financial firms. However, the incentive 
for cooperation among national regulators changes with shifts in the tradeoff that regulators face between 
safeguarding national competitiveness and promoting financial stability. A downward shock to 21 
 
confidence in financial stability makes increased regulation desirable and provides an incentive for 
regulators to harmonize, because only by doing so can they avoid jeopardizing the international 
competitiveness of their financial sectors.  
In this section we develop a formal model of regulatory coordination, in which policy is chosen 
optimally by each country to maximize an objective function that includes both maintaining 
competitiveness and promoting financial stability. The model suggests that the gains from coordination 
may be largest when there is a large common shock to confidence.  
If governments could agree to set aside the issue of competitiveness, where the effects of policy are 
zero sum, in favor of coordinated policies capable of improving the welfare of all, then they would 
increase the amount of regulation. However, finding the right mechanisms to enforce agreements to 
coordinate is difficult. The Nash equilibrium results from the best response by each country to the other’s 
policies: if country i knew that country j would carry out the coordinated policy, then its best policy 
response would be to cheat and revert to its uncoordinated reaction function. However, the Nash 
equilibrium is clearly inferior to a coordinated solution without cheating. 
The presence of common shocks to confidence may heighten countries’ awareness of the gains of 
coordination. Under Nash, if shocks to two countries’ financial stability are different, their optimal 
responses are different, and coordination may not be welfare-improving. In contrast, a common shock to 
confidence always produces gains from coordination. In the current crisis, the fact that confidence 
problems are global may be a powerful incentive to coordinate and harmonize regulation. 
The state of financial integration also matters for gains to coordination. If countries are perfectly 
integrated, then it does not matter who carries out the regulation, as all countries gain equally. Thus, 
countries may try to maintain competitive advantage by lowering their own regulatory burden, hoping 
that others will do the job for them. A system in which everyone is a free rider becomes increasingly 
unregulated. Only by putting in place some form of global regulation can the goal of financial stability be 
achieved in these circumstances. 
Technically, let us consider a formal model patterned after the informal discussion of these issues by 
Singer (2001), in which the objective function of national regulators depends on improving the 
competitiveness of the country’s financial firms as well as promoting financial stability (which Singer 
calls “confidence”). We will assume that the stringency of regulation, R, affects both variables: in a two-
country world, competitiveness C is proportional to the difference in regulation, while stability S in both 
countries depends directly on the country’s own regulation but also on the other country’s (but with a 
weight less than one). Formally, for countries i = 1, 2, (and j = 2, 1, the foreign country): 
Ci = α (R j ¯ Rj ) 
(1) 
Si = Ri + γ Rj ¯ ui  
(2) 22 
 




where S* is some target level of financial stability that is subject to a (negative) confidence shock. The 
regulator’s utility function, (3), is linear in competitiveness, but quadratic in financial stability because the 
regulator internalizes the inefficiencies that result from overregulation: there is an optimal amount of 
stability. The justification for the coefficient γ in (2), with 0 <γ < 1, is that a country’s regulation has a 
comparative advantage in furthering its own country financial stability, presumably  because some 
financial services are not traded. A perfectly globalized world for finance, which we consider later below, 
would set γ = 1. 
Let us consider the optimal amount of regulation for each economy, first when each economy chooses 
it independently (that is, under a Nash equilibrium) and second when all economies cooperate in choosing 
a common level of regulation to maximize joint utility. 
The Nash equilibrium: independent regulation 




γ − + + − =
* S u R R i j i  
(4) 
Solving the two countries’ reaction functions together gives  
 




























It can be seen that regulation is lower by an amount that depends on the negative effect of regulation 
on competitiveness (α) and inversely on the weight of stability in the objective function (β), while also 
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The cooperative equilibrium: joint decision making 
Suppose instead that the two countries collaborate and jointly choose regulation to maximize an 
equally weighted average of their two utility functions. In this case, they maximize utility U with respect 
to both countries’ regulation R=R1=R2 where utility is given by  
U=U1 +U2 =C1+C2 – β(S1 – S*)




The first-order condition in this case is simply the result of minimizing the last two terms, since the 
first two cancel out: 
–2β(1+ γ) ((1+ γ)R– u1 – S *) –2β(1+γ) ((1+ γR) – u2 – S*) =0  
 
 















Note that equation (8) is very similar to (5), but it is not reduced by the objective of gaining a 
competitive advantage over the other country and it depends on the average shock to confidence. The 
cooperative equilibrium leads to greater regulation on average, as each country knows that it need not 
worry about the other country’s attempt to become more competitive. 
Let us consider in some detail the case of identical shocks. If the two countries’ confidence shocks are 
the same, then (8) simplifies to 









which again is similar to (6) but with the omission of a negative term that reduces the amount of 
regulation in both countries. Thus, a Nash equilibrium results in a suboptimal amount of regulation. The 
cooperative equilibrium produces higher welfare in both countries by providing greater regulation—if the 
two countries can agree to cooperate and not to try to gain a competitive advantage over the other. Doing 
so is self-defeating, because, in the Nash equilibrium, both countries adopt the same policies, with the 
result that neither succeeds in becoming more competitive relative to the other. The gain in utility from 





N are the utilities of country i evaluated at 






= ∆ i U  
(10) 
Thus, when the shocks to confidence are identical, then the gains from coordination are always 
positive and are independent of the shock itself. The shock is completely offset by the coordinated 
policies, which achieve the goal S*  for financial stability as well as maintaining equal competitive 
positions. 
The general case when ui ≠ uj is ambiguous. Here, the optimal Nash and coordinated policies are 
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This condition indicates that the two shocks, if both positive, cannot be very different in magnitude if 
there are to be gains from coordination (the same applies for the other country j). If the shocks are very 
different, for instance if country i’s shock ui is large and j’s is close to zero, then there may not be gains 
from coordination for country i  (though there could be for country  j). The possibility of gains also 
depends on the extent of globalization. If the spillovers on financial stability are large, that is, if γ goes to 
one, then the middle term  of (11) goes to infinity, magnifying the effects of asymmetric shocks to 
confidence on competitiveness. 
Globalization 
The case of increased globalization can be studied by letting γ  → 1. In the limiting c ase, with a 
common shock u  to confidence, the first-order conditions become indeterminate. In the case of 
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These two equations cannot be solved for individual values of R1, R2, only for their sum. Doing so 
implies that the total of regulation R1 + R2 is set optimally at a point that trades off financial stability for 
competitiveness. But this can be done through any arbitrary sharing of the regulatory burden. Given this 
indeterminacy, countries would no doubt prefer that the other country did the regulating. In these 
circumstances, harmonization would be necessary to rule out a downward spiral of deregulation. 
IX.  Concluding Remarks  
The indicators that we have developed in this paper should prove useful to track changes in 
confidence as we go forward. Already, there has been a small upturn, as credit spreads have narrowed and 
stock markets have experienced a substantial rebound. Time will tell whether these improvements prove 
to be durable. It may be the case that a lasting revival of confidence requires more far-reaching changes to 
the regulatory environment than have already occurred. So far, reforms have been modest, and the hoped-
for agreement on regulatory issues has not yet materialized.  
We have argued that the existence of a common shock to confidence can be a powerful motivating 
force for governments to agree on harmonized regulatory reforms. However, getting there faces a number 
of difficult hurdles. Most important is the reluctance of countries with major financial centers to weaken 
their competitive advantage. In the absence of a supra-national regulatory authority, any agreement would 
have  to be on a voluntary basis, and countries face somewhat different regulatory challenges and 
institutional environments. National regulatory authorities retain responsibility for their financial sectors 
and will guard their freedom of maneuver. Finally, as confidence improves, even if only partially, the 
pressure on politicians to undertake a significant remake of the global financial regulatory system and/or 
make progress on national regulatory reform may wane. 
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